وضعیت نظام بانکداری ایران در سرمایه گذاری در تولید؛ چالشها و راهکارها

This paper takes a close look at why Iran’s banks struggle to back real-sector projects and instead funnel money into quick-turnaround, speculative ventures. Rather than acting as long-term partners for manufacturers and innovators, many banks have drifted toward short-term lending, trading activities and even direct ownership of non-bank businesses. We suggest that a mix of weak governance, outdated regulations, opaque lending practices and high non-performing loan ratios has discouraged meaningful investment in factories, farms and small-to-medium enterprises. Equally important is the gap between prevailing interest rates and the slower payback timelines typical of industrial projects, which makes borrowing prohibitively expensive for many producers.

To see what might work, we compare Iran’s situation with countries that have built effective “development banks.” In Germany, South Korea, China and India, specialized financial institutions operate under clear mandates to provide long-horizon credit, share risk with the state and align closely with national industrial strategies. Their success stories offer practical lessons in everything from board-level independence and transparent credit-assessment frameworks to targeted loan products and performance-linked incentives.

Drawing on these insights, we propose a series of interlocking reforms: strengthen bank boards and separate political interference from day-to-day lending decisions; create or empower dedicated development banks with a mission to finance productive activities; overhaul credit-rating and project-evaluation tools; and publish regular, detailed reports on loan portfolios to boost accountability. Crucially, policymakers, bankers and industry leaders must work together to ensure these changes would remain.